Climber Fall with Serious Injuries
Climber's life likely saved by climbing helmet
May 17, 2007
El Capitan, The Nose - Eagle Ledge
THE RESCUE:
At about 9:30 am on May 17, Yosemite Dispatch received a 911 telephone call reporting a seriously injured climber on the Nose route of El Capitan in Yosemite National Park. The reporting party, photographer Tom Evans, had been watching/photographing climbers through his telescope from El Capitan Meadow at the base of the cliff when the accident occurred. He stated that he could see a blood trail on the rock and hear cries for help coming from the accident site.
The dispatcher soon received additional cell phone calls from other climbers on the Nose route, who were close enough to the accident site to shout back and forth to the injured climber's partner. They indicated that the victim (later identified as A.S.) had fallen an estimated 100-150 feet while leading pitch 18. He was conscious but had what appeared to be an open fracture of his left femur.
NPS search and rescue (YOSAR) immediately began organizing for the rescue. By means of a telescope and loudspeaker, one team member, the "spotter", was able to view the scene from El Capitan Meadow and establish the following information from the victim's partner, J.M.: the two climbers were on Eagle Ledge, approximately 1,600 feet above the base of the wall. A.S. had been unresponsive for several minutes after the fall but was now conscious, mentally oriented, and following commands. He could move and feel his hands and feet and had no significant signs or symptoms of spinal injury. The bleeding from his leg had been heavy but was now under control. Even without the leg injury, however, the long fall and temporary loss of consciousness made this case an emergency because of possible head and internal injuries.
While the spotter was gathering information, YOSAR developed primary and backup plans for accessing and extracting A.S. Plan A was to lower two rescuers directly to Eagle Ledge by helicopter hoist and then hoist A.S. into the aircraft. The speed of this method would give A.S. the best chance of survival if his condition worsened. Under Plan B, a fifteen-person team would fly to the top of El Capitan, lower rescuers 1000 feet down the face, and either raise A.S. to the summit or lower him to the ground. While much slower than the Plan A, it could be accomplished even if weather or other factors prevented a direct helicopter rescue. The two operations would be conducted simultaneously.
Helicopter H-40 from the California Highway Patrol Fresno Air Unit responded as the hoist aircraft and helicopter 1109, from Intermountain Helicopters, Columbia, CA, was assigned to ferry the summit team. At about 11:35 am H-40 picked up Ranger Jack Hoeflich for the first insertion. Since the cliff at the rescue scene was almost vertical, H-40's rotor blades were very close to the rock as it hovered over Eagle Ledge. Increasing and shifting winds, with gusts to 20-25 mph, added to the stress on the crew and the danger to the mission. Nevertheless H-40 was able to insert Hoeflich and medical gear. On the next flight, H-40 inserted Ranger Keith Lober and a rescue litter.
Eagle Ledge is about four feet long by 18 inches wide at its widest point. Hoeflich and Lober found it coated with A.S.'s blood, which oozed over the side in a long trail. A.S. lay sprawled on the ledge, taking up most of its surface. H-40 returned after Hoeflich and Lober had assessed A.S. for injuries and packaged him in the litter. The winds had increased and were buffeting the aircraft but H-40 was able to pick up the patient and deliver him to a PHI medivac helicopter waiting in the meadow. By this time wind conditions made helicopter retrieval of the rescuers impossible, so Hoeflich, Lober, and J.M. began the first of a dozen rappels down the cliff to the ground. Meanwhile, A.S. was flown by PHI to Memorial Medical Center in Modesto, arriving at the emergency room about 4 hours after his fall. In addition to the femur fracture, he was diagnosed with compression fractures of three thoracic vertebrae, a minor fracture of the jaw, broken teeth, many bruises, and the loss of about one liter of blood. He is expected to make a full recovery.
THE ACCIDENT:
A.S. and J.M. were on their first climbing trip to the U.S. from their homes in Europe. A.S., 28, had been climbing alpine and rock routes for over 11 years and climbed at a high level of difficulty. Most of his experience was in sport and traditional free climbing. He had about one year's experience with aid, however he was competent at placing protection. J.M., 23, had been climbing only two years. He had less leading skill and very little aid experience, so A.S. was leading most of the pitches. Although they had climbed long alpine routes in Europe, this was their first big wall. May 17th was their second day on the route; they were on schedule and the climb was going well.
A.S. had led the King Swing from Boot Flake (pitch 17) and was now leading pitch 18, aid-climbing a crack behind a long flake. Like many pitches on El Cap, the crack was of fairly uniform width. Although he carried three of each size of camming device (as recommended in SuperTopo), A.S. felt he should "back-clean" or "leap-frog" his protection, i.e., he would place a cam attached to an etrier/daisy combination, place another while standing in the first etrier, then remove the first cam and place it higher. He planned to occasionally leave a piece in place for protection in case of a fall. This practice left few pieces of protection below him, but he could reuse the same size cams later on the pitch. He had led several pitches on the route this way with no problems, but he was exposed to long falls if a piece failed.
As he started pitch 18, A.S. clipped the rope through a quick-draw on a bolt immediately above the anchor. After climbing about 35 ft, using mostly small cams, he left his first piece, a medium-sized, rigid-stem Friend, where the crack began to widen. He clipped a 12" sling to the Friend to keep the rope's movement from dislodging the piece. He moved higher on medium Camalots until the Friend was a few feet beneath his feet. At this point he was an estimated 40-45 ft above the belay.
Just as he removed one Camalot to place it higher, the piece he was weighting with his left foot pulled out and he fell. He had judged the Friend below to be good fall protection when he placed it, but as he fell past it and the rope came tight, he heard a "pop", saw the Friend pull out, and knew he was in for a long fall. The next thing he remembers is waking up dangling 10 feet below Eagle Ledge, after a fall of over 100 feet. He was in pain and bleeding from his leg and his face. It is difficult to know exactly how he was injured--he most likely struck Eagle Ledge before J.M. was able to stop the fall (with a Grigri), but at the speed he reached, a glancing blow on the wall could have been enough.
While nearby climbers called for help, J.M. rappelled to Eagle Ledge and fashioned a 2:1 mechanical advantage raising system using the haul line. With J.M. pulling from above, A.S. was able to use his one good leg to get himself up to Eagle Ledge, where he awaited rescue.
LESSONS LEARNED:
It is obvious to A.S. in retrospect that he under-protected the pitch. He would normally have left more pieces, especially if free climbing, but it had seemed to him that just standing on aid pieces required fewer protection points, and he may have been overly concerned about running out of specific sizes. He had little experience climbing granite, and other climbers had told him that back-cleaning and leap-frogging were common practices on big wall routes. He had also observed the practice himself many times among other parties climbing near him on the Nose.
He's not sure why the cams failed. The flake did not seem to be expanding and he felt both pieces were secure, although the Camalot was in a slight flare. He would have placed another piece close to the Friend as insurance, if he had thought it was marginal, and he was very surprised when it failed. He wonders if its rigid stem made it prone to walking into an unstable position despite the sling. He also could have left smaller cams in the narrower part of the crack below the Friend without depleting the medium sizes - there is sufficient variability in this crack for better protection.
A.S.'s prior experience plus his faith in both of the failed placements underscores the importance of backing yourself up. This isn't a case of a beginner misjudging his protection, nor is this strictly a big wall mistake--it can, and does, happen anywhere. YOSAR has seen several cases of "solid" cam placements failing, even under body weight, with serious injuries and deaths resulting.
Clipping the rope through the directional at the belay was a very smart move: It didn't shorten the fall by much, but it allowed J.M. to deal with the force of the catch as an upward pull, with his bodyweight helping him, instead of yanking him downward and possibly off his stance.
Both climbers get gold stars for wearing their helmets. A.S.'s helmet was six months old and undamaged prior to the fall. Afterward, the energy-absorbing liner was ruptured in the back and crushed in front. That helmet almost certainly saved his life.
Written by John Dill and Keith Lober
Information from Keith Lober, Jack Hoeflich, A.S., and J.M.
PICTURES:
Rescue personnel being lowered by CHP onto Eagle Ledge. Photo donated by Tom Evans
Injured climber being flown back to El Cap meadow while suspended from the hoist arm.
Photo by David Pope
Climber's helmet with visible impact points. Photo by David Pope
Climber's helmet with ruptured rear. Photo by David Pope