Rescue of Climber Injured in 80-Foot Lead Fall
August 21, 2007
Half Dome, Northwest Face, Regular Route
THE INCIDENT:
(Based on interviews with Ryan Worsham on 8/21/07 and Robert Kuntz on 8/22/07.)
On Sunday evening, August 19, 2007, Robert Kuntz and Ryan Worsham hiked up the slabs approach to the Northwest Face of Half Dome. Their plan was to climb the Regular Route of the Northwest Face (VI 5.9 C1) in a one-day push. After talking to other climbers and reading about the route they thought this goal was within their ability.
Kuntz had seven years of overall climbing experience, including five years of traditional climbing. He had climbed several long alpine free-climbing routes. However, he had not climbed any Yosemite big walls or overnight walls elsewhere. He comfortably led 5.10b traditional and 5.10c sport climbs, and had led aid climbs up to C-2.
Worsham had 10 years of climbing experience. He also had limited aid-climbing experience and had not completed any Yosemite-style big walls.
The pair brought limited supplies for the climb, hoping to go light and fast. For their bivy at the base of the route they brought light sleeping bags, fleece jackets, and extra food.
They started climbing at 0630 on Monday, August 20, equipped with a light rack (a set of HB Offset nuts, 14 cams up to one #3 Camalot, and several runners), one 60m dynamic rope, a pair of Petzl ascenders with etriers for the follower, 7 liters of water, 4 power bars and some hard candy (totaling about 700 calories per person). Kuntz wore a long-sleeve wicking top, long pants, wool socks, and shoes. Worsham wore a t-shirt, long pants, shoes, and no socks. They had one beanie, one helmet, and a pair of leather gloves between them. They also brought Kuntz’s cell phone, as well as two headlamps for the descent from the summit to their bivy at the base of the route, but left their sleeping bags and jackets at the base.
After the first 11 pitches they felt they were moving fast enough to finish in daylight. Pitch 12 was Kuntz’s lead. He somehow missed the recommended crack and was heading for a 5.9 squeeze variation, when he saw what appeared to be an easier passage through the chimney to gain the next belay. This proved to be the wrong way to go and they lost up to 1.5 hours reversing the error. Kuntz led the next three pitches of chimneys. After following Pitch 15 on ascenders, Worsham forgot to coil the trailing rope, catching it in a crack. He had to rappel, free the rope, and re-ascend, losing further time. After re-gaining the belay he led pitch 16.
By the time they reached the start of pitch 17 they realized that they would not complete the route before dark. They decided to sleep on Big Sandy Ledge, at the top of 17, and finish the climb in the morning. While Worsham belayed at a double piton anchor, Kuntz started leading the pitch, anxious to make up for the lost time he felt he had cost them. Pitch 17 traverses down 10 feet and right 25-30 feet, then follows a crack system up and right. About 40 feet into the crack system, ledges traverse to the right and up 10 more feet to Big Sandy Ledge. Kuntz got off route by following a vertical double crack system before he had traversed far enough to reach Big Sandy. The left-hand crack was wide, requiring a #4 Camalot, which he lacked. The right-hand crack was narrower, and shallow in places, but he was forced to use it for protection.
To this point he had protected the pitch as follows:
- Clipped a bolt on the ledge about ten feet to the right of their belay,
- Clipped a fixed piton 25-30 feet further right,
- Placed a #3 Black Diamond Camalot and then back-cleaned it,
- Clipped a fixed nut about 15 feet above the piton,
- Placed and clipped a Hugh Banner (HB) offset nut at the base of the right-hand crack, about ten feet above and ten feet to the right of the fixed nut,
- P laced a red (#1) Black Diamond Camalot C3 in the right-hand crack, about five feet above the HB nut, and clipped into it using a shoulder-length sling.
By this time he was improvising direct aid techniques, high-stepping into the protection slings to place the next piece of protection. While standing in the sling attached to the red C3, he placed a gold (#4) Wild Country Zero cam (7) five or six feet higher. He was not confident of the Zero due to the shallowness of the crack and a heavy growth of lichen, which prevented the lobes of the cam from gaining a direct purchase on the rock. However, since the C3 cam (6) seemed “bomb proof”, he thought it was safe enough to try weighting the Zero for aid. He started to pull himself up using the sling attached to the Zero. Suddenly he heard a “ping” and saw the Zero come out of the crack. Since his foot was still in the sling of the C3 cam below, he was pitched off balance and fell upside down and backwards. Kuntz estimates the time of his fall to be 1900-1930.
During the fall the HB nut (5) and the fixed nut (4) both pulled out. The fixed piton (2) arrested Kuntz after he had fallen 80-90 feet. The Black Diamond C3 piece (6) remained in the crack above; the sling and carabiner were still attached to it but the rope was not.
At the end of his fall Kuntz struck hard against a bulge in the wall, first with his lower back and then with his chest and helmet. He never lost consciousness and did not sustain a concussion. Although he had fallen about 50 feet lower than the belay ledge, he was able to climb back up to the ledge and get into a secure position next to Worsham. Kuntz knew he was probably injured, but he didn’t feel any pain immediately.
After a brief discussion about whether or not to continue, they decided that they were done for the day. They relocated their anchor to the lower bolt (1), backing it up with a cam. A right-facing corner at this location would give them more protection from the wind. Once Kuntz stopped moving he started to feel more and more pain radiating around his lower back. He thought he may have broken some ribs and even his spine, but he and Worsham could find no signs of nerve damage, internal bleeding, or other serious injury. When they examined Kuntz's helmet they found a crack in the back running clear through the foam, but no indentations.
Kuntz’s cell-phone battery had died during the climb, so there was no way to immediately call for help. They decided they would wait for a party they’d seen at the base to come up the route on Tuesday, or Worsham would descend to them. A third option was to try to climb out. However, as time passed the pain in Kuntz's back became debilitating and any movement made it worse.
A little after 0300 Tuesday morning they heard two people chatting on the summit. By shouting and using their headlamps, Kuntz and Worsham were able to communicate their location, the nature of Kuntz's injuries, and their need for a rescue. The party on top contacted the park dispatcher by cell phone.
Kuntz and Worsham tried to stay warm through the night by huddling close together and hiding in the corner from the wind. Kuntz had more clothing than Worsham, so he remained on the outside and draped his arm around Worsham, shielding Worsham’s back from the cold rock. Nevertheless, by morning they were both at least mildly hypothermic, and Kuntz was feeling extreme pain in his lower back.
THE SAR RESPONSE:
At 0645 a member of the park’s search and rescue (SAR) team contacted them by loudspeaker from the Valley floor. Using arm signals in response to his questions, Kuntz and Worsham were able to describe their situation. By 0945 the SAR team had been placed on the summit by helicopter. They lowered two rescuers and, at 1145, raised Kuntz 600 feet to the top in a litter. He was flown to the Valley, transferred to an air ambulance, and arrived at
ANALYSIS:
The immediate cause of Kuntz's long fall and the resulting injury is the fact that the rope was not clipped through the Camalot C3. Otherwise, the fall probably would have been short and of little consequence. Kuntz is sure that he clipped through the Camalot, primarily because he wanted the protection of such a solid placement, and he feels that the rope unclipped itself. Earlier in the day his rope had become unclipped from another carabiner that was also attached to a sling he was standing in. Although he didn’t see it as it happened, he theorized that the carabiner was held in a fixed position by the pressure of his foot. If the rope had happened to drape itself over the gate of the fixed carabiner, either tension on the rope or pressure from his foot on the gate could have unclipped it. Kuntz felt that aiding with an etrier clipped directly to the Camalot would have left the protection sling and carabiner unimpeded, alleviating if not eliminating the risk. It also would have increased their speed on the aid sections of the route and should have been part of the leader’s gear from the start.
According to Kuntz, a significant contributing cause was haste. After the team fell behind on pitch 12, he felt rushed to make up the lost time or to at least reach Big Sandy Ledge for the night. He fell victim to “tunnel vision,” i.e., he became less aware of his options. He started up the wrong cracks mid-way up pitch 17 because that was the first option he saw. He said, “in retrospect the lichen in the cracks and the fact that the cracks weren’t polished like the rest of the route should have tipped me off that we were off route.” Worsham said that he told Kuntz at least twice to check out the ledge system to the right, that the topo said to move right to Big Sandy, and that if there was lichen in the cracks it had to be the wrong way. Kuntz doesn’t remember Worsham giving him advice, but thinks that was probably because he was too focused on the path he had chosen and on the climbing he was already involved in.
In Kuntz’s opinion, several other factors affected their situation:
- Seven liters of water was one or two liters too much. It added unnecessary weight, slowing them down.
- A #4 Camalot would have been useful, especially in chimneys.
- Leaving their warm fleece jackets and emergency food at the base led to a very cold night.
- Kuntz's foam helmet provided significant insulation against the cold that night.
- They should have brought two helmets. In addition to the usual reasons, they were narrowly missed by rocks launched from the summit by tourists, and a haul bag dropped by climbers above.
Kuntz realizes he was very lucky to have survived the fall with relatively minor injuries. Perhaps because he rotated outward as he fell, he missed several ledges directly in his path that could have done far greater damage.
Contributions by Jesse McGahey and John Dill
Looking over the edge. Rescuers reaching the patient and his climbing partner.
Photo - David Pope
Raising the patient to the top of Half Dome. Photo - David Pope
Rescuer and patient being raised toward the Diving Board of Half Dome. Photo - David Pope
Making the final edge transition. Photo - David Pope